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Abstract
We study exchanges between three overlapping generations with non-dynastic al-
truism. The middleaged choose informal care provided to their parents and education
expenditures for their children. The young enjoy their education, while the old may
leave a bequest to their children. Within each period the three generations play a
\game" inspired by Becker's (1974, 1991) rotten kids framework, with the added fea-
tures that the rotten kids turn into the altruistic parent in the next period and that
parents invest in the education of their children. We show that Becker's rotten kids
theorem holds for the single period game in that informal aid is set according to an
ecient rule. However, education is distorted upwards. In the stationary equilibrium
the levels of both transfers are inecient: education is too large and informal aid is
too low.
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1 Introduction
Understanding intergenerational transfers within the family is a crucial ingredient for the
design of various policies like education and long-term care. This paper studies intergener-
ational exchanges in an overlapping generation (OLG) framework with three generations:
the young, the middleaged (parents) and the old (grandparents). The parents choose two
transfers: (i) informal care provided to their parents, and (ii) education expenditures for
their children. The young enjoy their education while the old may leave a bequest to their
children. Individuals are altruistic but in a non-dynastic way; altruism is limited to the
following generation. Within each period the three generations play a \game" inspired by
Becker's (1974, 1991) rotten kids framework, with the added features that the rotten kids
turn into the altruistic parent in the next period and that parents invest in the education
of their children. We study the subgame perfect equilibrium of the single-period game
and then determine the stationary equilibrium of the multi-period setting.
Our results corroborate Becker's \rotten kids theorem" but only to a rather limited
extent. First, his eciency result obtains only in the single-period game and only for
caregiving services but not for education. Specically, aid is set according to an ecient
tradeo, while there is an upward distortion in education spending. Second, the stationary
equilibrium levels of both aid and education are inecient. Investments in education are
too high and this \spills over" to aid, the level of which is too low. This is because
excessive education, by boosting the wage rate, increases the opportunity cost of aid.1
There exists an extensive literature which studies education in an OLG model, but
these papers concentrate on very dierent issues like inequality, growth or the role of
public education.2 The predecessors to our paper which also focus on intergenerational
transfers to the young and old, on the other hand, do not consider altruism. For instance
Cremer et al. (1992) show that selsh parents underinvest in the education of their
children (even when they can commit to a strategic bequest rule). In their model the
parent's incentives to invest in their ospring's education are solely driven by the surplus
they can extract from an attention-for-bequest game. In a similar vein Rangel (2000)
and Boldrin and Montes (2005) consider voluntary exchanges between selsh generations.
1It is by now well known that Becker's theorem applies only under rather stringent conditions; see
Bergstrom (1989). However, these conditions hold in the one period version of our model; the failures we
identify are of a completely dierent nature and due to the OLG framework.
2See Glomm, Ravikumar and Schiopu (2011) and Oded (2011) for recent overviews of this literature.
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They show that providing education to the young is generally not sustainable unless it is
bundled with suciently large transfers (like a PAYGO pension scheme) to the old.
2 The model
Consider an OLG framework with three generations. Every period t a new generation
is born and lives for three periods. The agent is a child (superscript `c') in the rst
period, a parent (superscript `p') in the second period and a grandparent (superscript
`g') in the third period. Each generation consists of a single individual and is perfectly
altruistic towards the next generation. We assume that altruism is non-dynastic: parents
are altruistic only towards their own children but not towards their grandchildren. Every
period the parent decides how much to save st, how much care at to provide to the old
generation and how much education et to invest in the young generation. We assume
that the price for education is one and that care costs time of which the total amount is
again normalized to one. Grandparents are retired and have a monetary value h(at) (with
h0 > 0 and h00 < 0) of the care they receive from their children. The residual time 1 at is
spend on the labor market for which the parent receives a wage rate w(et 1). Their wage
rate increases in the education they got from their parents (the current grandparents)
implying w0 > 0. The current old choose the bequest bt  0 to leave to their children (the
current parents). The young simply enjoy their education and have no other decision to
make. The utility functions of the three generations in period t are given by
Ugt =u(st 1 + h(at)  bt) + u((1  at)w(et 1)  et + bt   st) + u(st + h(at+1)  bt+1);
(1)
Upt =u((1  at)w(et 1)  et + bt   st) + u(st + h(at+1)  bt+1)
+ u(et) + u((1  at+1)w(et)  et+1 + bt+1   st+1) + u(st+1 + h(at+2)  bt+2); (2)
U ct =u(et) + u((1  at+1)w(et)  et+1 + bt+1   st+1) + u(st+1 + h(at+2)  bt+2)
+ u(et+1) + u((1  at+2)w(et+1)  et+2 + bt+2   st+2) + u(st+2 + h(at+3)  bt+3);
(3)
with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. In the following we denote consumption levels in period t for a
parent as dt and for a grandparent as mt.
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3 Optimal allocation
As often in a dynamic setting, we dene the optimum as the allocation that maximizes
the lifetime utility of an individual who treats his children and his parents as he would
have liked to be treated himself when a child or when a parent (see, e.g., Cremer et
al., 1992). Note that the individual successively takes the role of c, p, and then g. We
count only the own utility, laundering out the altruistic terms. This yields the following
optimization problem
max
s;b;a;e
W = u(e) + u((1  a)w(e)  e+ b  s) + u(s+ h(a)  b): (4)
To ensure an interior solution we assume that W is concave. The rst order conditions
(FOCs) are given by
@W
@s
=  u0(d) + u0(m) = 0; (5)
@W
@b
=  u0(m) + u0(d) = 0; (6)
@W
@a
= u0(m)h0(a)  u0(d)w(e) = 0 ) h0(a) = w(e); (7)
@W
@e
=  u0(d) + u0(e) + u0(d)(1  a)w0(e) = 0: (8)
Note that only b   s (the net transfer) is determined. Let a; e; dand m denote the
solution to equations (5){(8).
4 Equilibrium
In each period t, parent and grandparent play the following three stage game. First,
the parent chooses at, the time devoted to aid their parent and the amount of money
to spend on the education of their child, et. Second, the grandparent decides how much
to leave as a bequest, bt. Finally, the parent chooses how much to save for old age, st.
Children receive education but do not make any decision. However, their utility aects
p and g's decisions through the altruistic terms in their utility. While playing this game,
p and g consider all past and future decisions made by other players as given (see, e.g.,
Veall, 1986). In each period t; the variables (at; et; bt; st) are determined by the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game. Observe that the timing of this game along with the
requirement for subgame perfection implies that grandparents cannot commit to some
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bequest rule which \rewards" or pays the caregivers. This rules out a strategic bequest
type solution. A stationary equilibrium denoted (a; e; b; s) is achieved when the solution
remains constant over time. We determine the subgame perfect equilibrium in period t
and then characterize the stationary equilibrium.
4.1 Period t
As usual the game is solved by backward induction.
4.1.1 Stage 3: savings
When deciding how much to save parents solve the following problem
max
st
Upt =u((1  at)w(et 1)  et + bt   st) + u(st + h(at+1)  bt+1)
+ u(et) + u((1  at+1)w(et)  et+1 + bt+1   st+1) + u(st+1 + h(at+2)  bt+2):
(9)
Observe that all other variables set in period t are by now given. Similarly all past and
future decisions made by other players are considered as given.3 Optimal savings are
determined by the following FOC
 u0(dt) + u0(mt+1) = 0: (10)
Savings set  st(bt; at; et) are chosen to (perfectly) smooth consumption over time. Com-
parative statics with respect to bt, at and et are given by
@set
@bt
=
u00(dt)
u00(dt) + u00(mt+1)
=
1
2
> 0; (11)
@set
@at
=
 u00(dt)w(et 1)
u00(dt) + u00(mt+1)
=  w(et 1)
2
< 0; (12)
@set
@et
=
 u00(dt)
u00(dt) + u00(mt+1)
=  1
2
< 0: (13)
In words, a higher inheritance increases savings by half of the additional wealth. Higher
aid reduces savings by half of the income loss that comes along with the provision of care.
Finally, higher education investments in the young reduce savings by half the amount
invested.
3We do not assume that bt+1 is considered as given. Parents may realize that their current savings
aect the bequest they will leave next period. However, because of the envelope theorem, this has no
rst-order eect on Upt .
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4.1.2 Stage 2: bequests
In the second stage the old generation chooses bt to maximize
max
bt
Ugt =u(st 1 + h(at)  bt) + u((1  at)w(et 1)  et + bt   set )
+ u(set + h(at+1)  bt+1): (14)
When determining the optimal bequests the grandparent takes into consideration its eect
on their ospring's savings, that is
 u0(mt) + u0(dt)

1  @s
e
t
@bt

+ u0(mt+1)
@set
@bt
= 0:
Using equations (10) and (11), the above equation can be rewritten as
 u0(mt) + u0(dt) = 0: (15)
The bequest bet  b(at; et) is chosen so as to equalize consumption levels of the grandparent
and the parent. Taking into consideration (12) and (13) the comparative static eects
with respect to at and et are given by
@bet
@at
=
u00(mt)h0(at) + u00(dt)
h
w(et 1) +
@set
@at
i
u00(mt) + u00(dt)
h
1  @set@bt
i = 2h0(at) + w(et 1)
3
> 0; (16)
@bet
@et
=
u00(dt)
h
1 +
@set
@et
i
u00(mt) + u00(dt)
h
1  @set@bt
i = 1
3
> 0: (17)
Equation (16) shows that caregivers are in fact compensated for the aid they provide.
However, bet cannot be arbitrarily chosen but it is given by the equilibrium of the second
stage subgame. Grandparents only give as much as they nd ex post (after aid is provided)
optimal to bequeath given their altruism. This is in line with Becker's \rotten kids"
mechanism; see Cremer and Roeder (2013) for a recent application to long-term care.
Equation (17) is more unusual and due to the three generational setting we consider.
Parents are in part compensated, by their own parents, for the expenditures on their
child's education. This is because et reduces their disposable income and thus increases
their marginal utility of income. This, in turn, induces the altruistic grandparents to
increase their bequest.
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4.1.3 Stage 1: care and education
In the rst stage the parent chooses at and et to maximize
max
at;et
Upt =u((1  at)w(et 1)  et + bt   st ) + u(st + h(at+1)  bt+1) + u(et)
+ u((1  at+1)w(et)  et+1 + bt+1   st+1) + u(st+1 + h(at+2)  bt+2): (18)
The FOCs with respect to at and et are given by
u0(dt)

 w(et 1) + @b

t
@at
  @s

t
@at

+ u0(mt+1)
@st
@at
= 0; (19)
u0(dt)

 1 + @b

t
@et
  @s

t
@et

+ u0(mt+1)
@st
@et
+ u0(et) + u0(dt+1)(1  at+1)w0(et) = 0: (20)
With equations (12), (13), (16) and (17), the above FOCs can be rearranged as
h0(at)  w(et 1) = 0; (21)
  2
3
u0(dt) + u0(et) + u0(dt+1)(1  at+1)w0(et) = 0: (22)
Comparing these expressions with their counterparts in Section 3, equations (7) and (8),
reveals that the equilibrium induces the ecient tradeo for care but not for education.
Specically, equation (22) implies an upwards distortion in the level of education. This is
because parents do not bear the full cost of their expenses; recall that 1/3 is refunded via
a higher bequest. Since they are altruistic they do however account for the full benets
of et.
4.2 Stationary equilibrium
Equations (10), (15), (21) and (22) show that the stationary equilibrium, (a; e; b; s),
satises the following conditions
u0(d)  u0(m) = 0; (23)
h0(a)  w(e) = 0; (24)
  2
3
u0(d) + u0(e) + u0(d)(1  a)w0(e) = 0; (25)
where m = s + h(a)   b, and d = (1   a)w(e)   e + b   s. Since (23) implies m = d, we
have
m = d =
(1  a)w(e)  e+ h(a)
2
: (26)
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The previous subsection has demonstrated that the period t equilibrium involves an e-
cient tradeo (rule) for at but that the rule for et implies an upward distortion. We now
examine how these tradeos aect the equilibrium levels of a and e and how they compare
to the optimal solution. Substituting from (23) and (24) into (25) we can express (25)
solely as a function of e
(e) = u0(e) + u0(d(e))

[1  a(e)]w0(e)  2
3

; (27)
where
a(e) = h0 1(w(e)); (28)
d(e) =
(1  a(e))w(e)  e+ h(a(e))
2
: (29)
By denition we have (e) = 0. Since (e) > 0, we can conclude that if (e) is
decreasing, we have e > e. But, the expression for 0(e) is rather complicated and its
sign is not obvious. So we take another path. By Substituting (5){(7) into (8) we can
express the latter equation solely as a function of e, this yields
(e) = u0(e) + u0(d(e))

[1  a(e)]w0(e)  1	 ; (30)
where we have a(e) = a(e) and d(e) = d(e). By denition e satises (e) = 0. Now,
the concavity ofW (and the SOC for the optimal solution) imply that (e) is everywhere
decreasing.4 Further observe that
(e)  (e) = 1
3
u0(d(e)) > 0:
In words, (e) is everywhere above (e) which in turn is decreasing. This immediately
implies that e, which is the solution to (e) = 0, is larger than e. This argument is
illustrated in Figure 1 for u(x) = ln(x), w(e) =
p
e and h(a) =
p
a.5
To sum up, we have an equilibrium level of education, e, that is larger than the optimal
level e. Interestingly, this ineciency \spills over" to the provision of aid. To see this,
4The detour via  is necessary because we cannot sign 0 (which is an equilibrium condition and not
a FOC) from the SOC. On the other hand 0 is the SOC for the maximization of W (reformulated to
have e as single decision variable).
5The gure also illustrates existence and uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium. Similar pictures
arise for dierent parameter values. A thorough study of the conditions for existence and uniqueness
would go beyond the scope of this note. From that perspective the illustration is useful because it shows
that no strong or \knife-edge" assumptions are needed for the equilibrium to exist.
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Figure 1: Illustration of (e) and (e) for u(x) = ln(x), w(e) =
p
e and h(a) =
p
a.
note that (28) implies a0(e) < 0, so that e > e directly implies a < a. In words, the
provision of aid will be too low, even though the period t equilibrium induces the ecient
tradeo (given e and thus w). Intuitively, a level of education that is \too high" causes
the wage level to be \too large"; since the wage represents the (opportunity) cost of aid,
the level of aid decreases.
5 Conclusion
We have studied intergenerational exchanges in an OLG framework with three genera-
tions. We have shown that Becker's rotten kids theorem holds for the single period game
in the sense that informal aid is set according to an ecient rule. However, education
spending is distorted upwards. The reason being that the old generation bears part of
the education costs via higher bequests. In the stationary equilibrium the level of both
transfers is inecient. Education is too high and since higher education translates into
higher opportunity costs of aid, the latter is too low.
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